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Abstract 
The concept of self-respect has received little attention in the psychological literature and is 
not clearly distinguished from self-esteem. The present research sought to empirically 
investigate the bases of self-respect by manipulating adherence to morals together with 
interpersonal appraisals, or task-related competence, in hypothetical scenarios (Studies 1a and 
1b) and a situation participants relived (Studies 2 and 3). Participants’ levels of state self-
respect and self-esteem were measured. Studies 1-3 found main effects of adherence to 
morals on self-respect, with self-respect mediating the effect of adherence to morals on self-
esteem, but little support for competence and interpersonal appraisals directly influencing 
self-respect. Self-respect uniquely contributed to anticipated/felt self-esteem alongside 
competence or interpersonal appraisals. The pattern of results supports the conceptualisation 
of self-respect as a component of self-esteem associated with morally principled conduct, 
distinct from performance and social self-esteem. The findings have implications for our 
understanding of self-esteem and moral behaviour. 
 
Keywords: Self-respect, self-esteem, moral self, competence, interpersonal appraisals
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While we are all familiar with the term “self-respect”, the concept has received much 
less attention in the psychological literature than self-esteem (Kristjansson, 2007; Roland & 
Foxx, 2003). The two concepts are not clearly distinguished, with the terms often used 
interchangeably in popular culture, or self-respect being used to operationalise global self-
esteem (e.g. Kernis, 2003; Marsh & O’Neil, 1984; Rosenberg, 1965). For example, 
Rosenberg, Schooler, Schoenbach, and Rosenberg (1995) write that the “central feature of 
global self-esteem appears to be self-acceptance or self-respect” and that “competence is only 
one factor contributing to such feelings” (p. 144). However, an examination of the 
philosophical and psychological literature suggests self-respect and self-esteem are rather 
distinct concepts and underlines the need for self-respect to take a more central place in 
psychological research.  
Following from the interpersonal respect literature, it is logical to conceptualise self-
respect as an attitude of respect for oneself, that is, a positive evaluation of oneself as 
valuable and deserving of respect, and therefore a specific self-evaluation, as opposed to a 
generalised attitude of favourableness or unfavourableness towards the self as a whole, i.e. 
global self-esteem (Rosenberg et al., 1995). Unlike liking, the attitude of respect is directed 
towards someone who possesses attributes that command recognition and appreciation, 
regardless of personal affinities and needs (Van Quaquebeke & Eckloff, 2010). Respect can 
be paid to someone on the basis of (1) their social position – often referred to as “status 
respect”, (2) their inherent worth as a human being (Prestwich & Lalljee, 2009) –often 
referred to as “unconditional respect”, or (3) on the basis of admirable personal qualities of a 
moral, principled or honourable nature (e.g., moral integrity, concern for others’ welfare, 
working to the limits of ability and mental toughness) and achievements, intellectual talents 
and skills (Clucas & St Claire, 2017; Frei & Shaver, 2002; Hamilton & Fallot, 1974; 
Prestwich & Lalljee, 2009) - often referred to as “achieved respect”. Similarly, the self-
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respect literature has distinguished between recognition and appraisal self-respect. The 
former is based on Kantian ideas and views self-respect as derived purely from an 
appreciation of personhood as a rational, autonomous, equal and moral agent (see 
Kristjansson, 2007; Renger, 2017). The latter is based on Aristotelian ideas and views self-
respect as earned and merit based, involving a positive appraisal or evaluation of oneself as 
worthy of honour and the “dutiful regard of oneself and others”, based on conformity to 
valued standards of conduct, moral integrity, and excellence of character (Dillon, 2010; 
Kumashiro, Finkel, & Rusbult, 2002, p. 1016; Kristjansson, 2007; Roland & Foxx, 2003). 
These two notions could exist alongside each other, in a similar manner to the attitudes of 
unconditional and achieved interpersonal respect (Clucas & St Claire, 2017).  
This paper concentrates on appraisal self-respect, which is more similar to self-esteem 
by its stronger evaluative and subjective nature and focus on individual merits, yet is not 
synonymous with it. Like self-esteem, self-respect is linked to a positive self-appraisal as 
worthy, but appears to be derived specifically from a favourable appraisal of one’s character 
and conduct, often from a moral viewpoint, as opposed to other qualities (Dillon, 2010; 
Roland & Foxx, 2003). Therefore, self-respect may not always be high in an individual with 
high self-esteem (Roland & Foxx, 2003) and is likely to exist alongside other well-known 
non moral specific self-evaluations such as performance, social approval and physical 
appearance (Harter, 1999, Marsh, Craven, & Martin, 2013), which all contribute to global 
self-esteem. Self-respect has been conceptualised both as a trait, with some people enjoying 
higher self-respect across time and situations than others (Brown & Marshall, 2006; 
Kristjansson, 2010; Kumashiro et al., 2002), and a state, fluctuating in response to temporary 
experiences (Luchies, Finkel, McNulty, & Kumashiro, 2010).  
Whilst self-respect has only rarely been presented as a distinct self-evaluation 
attached to a given domain in the psychological literature, there is some wider recognition 
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that self-esteem involves a sense of self-respect. For instance, the Rosenberg (1965) Self-
esteem Scale includes an item on self-respect. Also, Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper and 
Bouvrette (2003) measure the extent to which self-esteem is contingent on moral/ethical 
conduct and use the term self-respect (instead of self-esteem) in some of the measure’s items.  
Moreover, whilst moral/ethical conduct is recognised as a valued human strength 
cross-culturally (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005) and as a basis for self-esteem (see 
Crocker et al., 2003), moral self-esteem lacks a consistent operationalisation in trait and state 
multidimensional self-esteem measures, which sometimes assess moral character and 
behaviour along with religiosity (e.g. Tennessee Self-Concept scale, Fitts, 1964), honesty and 
trustworthiness more specifically (e.g. Self-description Questionnaire-III, Marsh & O’Neil, 
1984) or feelings of having engaged in morally acceptable behaviour (e.g. Multidimensional 
Self-esteem Inventory, O’Brien & Epstein, 1998). These disparate measures could actually be 
tapping on a broader self-evaluation as a principled, moral and honourable person worthy of 
high regard, i.e. self-respect (Kumashiro et al., 2002). Self-respect could therefore be an 
important pathway by which morally principled behaviour relates to self-esteem.  
Little research has sought to understand how best to conceptualise self-respect. Two 
notable exceptions provide indirect support for self-respect being attached to a self-
conception as moral and honourable. Kumashiro et al. (2002) showed that trait self-respect 
(defined as perceiving oneself as a principled person worthy of honour and high regard) 
predicted pro-relationship behaviour in marital relationships and well-being independently 
from self-esteem, thus also supporting self-respect and self-esteem being distinct constructs, 
although the self-respect measure did not undergo a thorough validation process. Luchies et 
al. (2010) demonstrated an increase in a single-item measure of state self-respect when 
forgiving a partner who made amends, supposedly the right or honourable thing to do. In 
addition, Renger (2017) showed recognition self-respect to be distinct from self-esteem. 
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However, the idea that self-respect is related to moral integrity has never been tested directly 
and it is unclear whether self-respect has the same bases as interpersonal respect. More 
research is needed to identify the bases of self-respect, including its relationship with other 
major specific self-evaluations such as task-related competence and social approval. 
Task-related competence is often considered a facet of self-esteem (Harter, 1999; 
Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). However, it is unclear whether task-related competence also 
influences self-respect. In addition to qualities relating to moral integrity and principled 
behaviour, admirable qualities such as being inspiring and possessing talents, intellectual 
qualities and skills (Frei & Shaver, 2002; Hamilton & Fallot, 1974; Prestwich, & Lalljee, 
2009) have been shown to influence respect for others. This raises the question of whether 
task-related competence influences self-respect in addition to principled, honourable and 
moral behaviour.  
Similarly, the relationship between self-respect and interpersonal appraisals has not 
been explored. Much literature has emphasised that self-esteem is influenced by social 
approval and acceptance (Coopersmith, 1967; Leary, Haupt, Strausser, & Chokel, 1998). On 
the other hand, an individual’s self-respect appears to be based on his/her appraisal of his/her 
own conduct and character and thus appears to be primarily internally driven. Moreover, 
research has shown that whilst respect is more strongly linked to intellectual attributes, such 
as skill, intelligence and commitment, liking is more strongly linked to social qualities, such 
as warmth and popularity (Hamilton & Fallot, 1974; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002; Lalljee 
& Prestwich, 2009). As a result, interpersonal appraisals might be expected to influence self-
liking rather than self-respect.  
The dearth of research on self-respect has hindered a solid understanding of the nature 
of the construct. Yet, support that self-respect is a component of self-esteem based on moral 
integrity would further suggest self-respect is likely to have important implications for moral 
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behaviour and social relationships in ways that self-esteem more globally may not (see 
Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003, Kumashiro et al., 2002; Roland & Foxx, 
2003) and its more controllable nature may make it more amenable to intervention.  
Four experimental studies were conducted to further our psychological understanding 
of self-respect by investigating the influence of adherence to moral principles, interpersonal 
appraisals and task-related competence on anticipated or experienced self-respect and self-
esteem, and exploring how these concepts differ from and relate to each other. It was 
hypothesised that (1) adherence to morals will influence self-respect directly, (2) self-respect 
will mediate the effect of adherence to morals on self-esteem, (3), interpersonal appraisals 
will influence self-esteem rather than self-respect, (4) task-related competence will influence 
self-esteem (its effect on self-respect will be explored). Studies 1a and 1b investigated the 
influence of adherence to morals together with academic competence (Study 1a) or 
interpersonal appraisals (Study 1b) on anticipated state self-respect and self-esteem in 
hypothetical scenarios. Study 2 investigated participants’ levels of state self-respect and self-
esteem when reliving a situation in their life in which they had (or had not) compromised on 
their morals and performed well (or badly) academically. Study 3 was similar to Study 2 but 
focused on more broadly defined task-related competence. 
Studies 1a and 1b 
Participants completed an online questionnaire, which instructed them to imagine themselves 
into one of four scenarios (assigned at pseudo-random by rotating questionnaire versions 
approximately every ten participants) manipulating adherence to morals with interpersonal 
appraisals (IA) (Study 1a) or with academic competence (Study 1b), creating a 2 X 2 
between-subjects factorial design in each study. Participants completed self-respect (SR) and 
self-esteem (SE) measures at baseline and whilst imagining themselves in the scenario.  
Study 1a Method 
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Participants. One-hundred and fifty-nine UK university students were recruited 
through the psychology department online research participation system (RPS). Sample 
characteristics are shown in Table 1. All studies were approved by the Psychology 
Department University Ethics Committee. Participation was voluntary and anonymous. 
Materials and procedure. Participants were asked to imagine that they belonged to a 
prestigious student society and they either lied (without society peers knowing) or did not lie 
about their background to fit in, rejecting past friends, going against or abiding to their moral 
code and standards they cared about (low (LM) and high adherence to morals (HM) 
respectively – see Appendix A for verbatim). Following the procedure of Leary et al. (1998), 
participants were then asked to imagine they had the chance to find out exactly how the 
society members had rated them on the extent to which they would be willing to engage with 
them in four social activities (such as inviting them if they were planning a party). The 
ratings were either high (positive IA) or low (negative IA) (see Appendix A). The four 
scenarios were matched on all characteristics, except the manipulated dimensions.  
Manipulation checks. Participants indicated (a) how accepted by peers (IA ratings) 
and (b) how principled and moral they felt (moral ratings) on 1 (very rejected) to 10 (very 
accepted), and 1 (very immoral) to 10 (very moral) numeric rating scales. 
Outcome measures. A three-item scale was used to measure state SR in the scenario. 
Items were responded to on 7-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
and included: “I feel I have a high level of self-respect”, “I have a lot of respect for myself” 
and “I wish I could have more respect for myself” (α =.89). In all studies, parallel analysis 
using the fa.parallel function in the psych R-package (Revelle, 2018)1 supported the SR items 
representing a single factor with factor loadings from .51 to .99 across studies. The single 
item validated by Robins, Hendin and Trzesniewski (2001): I have high self-esteem” (rated 
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on a Likert scale of 1 = not very true of me, 7 = very true of me) was used to measure state 
SE in the scenario.   
Baseline measures. Trait SE was measured using the 10-item 4-point Likert 
Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree).2 
Trait SR was measured using the 8-item trait Self-respect Scale (SRS), which showed good 
construct validity, and internal reliability in past research (Clucas & Wilkinson, 2017), and α 
= .86 in the present sample. Examples of items are “I will stick to my principles even if asked 
to do otherwise” and “I see my behaviour as dignified” (rated a Likert scale from 1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree) (developed to represent attributes contributing to a self-
conception as moral, principled and honourable based on existing literature, see Kristanjsson, 
2007; Kumashiro et al., 2002; Luchies et al., 2010).  
State SE was also measured using Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) 20-item Likert state 
self-esteem scale (SSES) (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely, α = .93) and state SR using the items: 
“I have a lot of respect for myself” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and “I wish I 
could have more respect for myself” (1= strongly disagree, 4= strongly agree), whose 
standardised scores were averaged into one index  (Spearman-Brown coefficient (rSB) = .60).
3 
Scores were averaged for multi-item outcome measures, manipulation checks and baseline 
SR measures. Total scores were otherwise computed. 
Analytical approach. A 2 X 2 MANOVA was used given the strong correlation 
between anticipated scenario SR and SE (rho = .70).4 Despite being high, a correlation of .70 
indicates that 51 per cent (1 - .702) of the variance in state SR and SE remains unshared 
(Studies 2 and 3 further support the measures as tapping two strongly related but distinct 
factors in line with our conceptualisation of SR as a specific self-evaluation as worthy of 
respect). A high correlation between the measures was expected given a reciprocal 
relationship between specific self-evaluations and global SE (Rosenberg et al., 1995). As a 
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component of global SE, high state SR is expected to boost global state SE whilst positive 
affectivity associated with high global state SE is likely to inflate global state appraisals of 
SR (Sedikides, Wildschut, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006). In view of this reciprocal relationship, 
analyses investigating influences on SR examined whether the results were accounted for by 
global SE feelings whilst in the scenario, and vice versa, using ANCOVA. This was done in 
all studies. Baseline state SR and SE were also adjusted for by being added as covariates in 
MANOVA and in anticipated SR and SE ANCOVAs respectively since they related to the 
outcome measures. Correlations between measures for all studies can be found in Appendix 
D.  
Study 1a Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses. There was no difference between the conditions in 
participants’ age, sex and ethnicity, SE or SR (trait or state).  
Manipulation checks. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for manipulation check 
and outcome measures. 2 X 2 ANOVAs confirmed participants rated themselves more 
morally principled in the HM versus LM condition, F(1,149)=87.81, p<.001 (Ƞp2=.37) and 
felt more accepted by peers in the positive versus negative IA condition, F(1, 149) = 301.10, 
p < .001 (Ƞp2= .67).  
Higher moral ratings were also found in the positive vs. negative IA condition, 
F(1,149)=44.04, p<.001 (Ƞp2= .23), with no interaction between factors. Because of this 
finding, results are also presented for the effect of IA after controlling for moral ratings in 
anticipated SR and SE ANCOVA analyses. This finding raises the possibility that social 
(dis)approval by peers can intensify self-perceptions of (im)moral and (un)principled 
behaviour.  
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Main results. 2 X 2 MANCOVA showed a significant multivariate main effect of 
adherence to morals, F(2,127)=27.85, p<.001; Wilk’s Lamba = .70, Ƞp2=.31 and IA, 
F(2,127)=19.23, p<.001; Wilk’s Lamba = .77, Ƞp2=.23, and no interaction.  
Adherence to morals. Univariate tests showed a significant effect of adherence to 
morals on SR, F(1,128)=52.73, p<.001 (Ƞp2= .29), CI95% = [1.222, 2.137], and SE, F(1,128)= 
9.17, p=.003 (Ƞp2=.07), CI95% = [.262, 1.249], in the expected direction. The effect on SR 
remained after controlling for anticipated SE in the scenario, F(1, 143)=57.08, p<.001 (Ƞp2= 
.29), CI95% = [1.009, 1.723]. Hypothesis 1 that adherence to morals will influence self-respect 
was therefore supported. Moreover, the effect of adherence to morals on SE was reversed and 
no longer significant after controlling for SR, F (1, 129) = 2.24, p=.137 (Ƞp2=.02), CI95% = [-
.807, .112].  
A mediation analysis using regression (see Table 3), followed by bootstrap procedures 
based on 5000 random samples with replacement from the full sample to construct bias-
corrected confidence intervals (MacKinnon, Fairchild & Fritz, 2007), adjusting for the IA 
manipulation and baseline state SR and SE, showed the size of the indirect effect (1.12) to 
differ significantly from zero (.74, 1.58), indicating that anticipated SR mediated the effect of 
adherence to morals on anticipated SE, thus supporting hypothesis 2.  
Interpersonal appraisals. Univariate tests showed a significant effect of IA on SE 
F(1, 128)= 36.57, p<.001 (Ƞp2=.22), CI95% = [.682, 1.607], in the expected direction. 
Hypothesis 3 that IA will influence self-esteem was therefore supported. This effect remained 
significant after controlling for moral ratings, F (1,131) = 10.70, p =.001 (Ƞp2=.08), CI95% = 
[.349, 1.417], or anticipated SR, F (1,129) = 11.61, p =.001 (Ƞp2=.08), CI95% = [.303, 1.144], 
alongside anticipated SR, F (1, 129) = 81.31, p<.001 (Ƞp2=.39). This pattern of results 
suggests that both SR and IA uniquely influence SE. 
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A significant effect on SR was also found, F(1,128)=23.99, p<.001(Ƞp2=.16), CI95% = 
[.682, 1.607], with higher anticipated SR in the positive versus negative IA condition. 
However, the effect became small after controlling for moral ratings, F(1, 143)= 4.83, p=.030 
(Ƞp2=.03), CI95% = [.051, .964] and non-significant after controlling for anticipated SE, F(1, 
143)= 3.02, p=.071 (Ƞp2=.02), CI95% = [-.030, .745] (p=.298, Ƞp2=.01 when controlling for 
both variables). The effect of IA on SR was therefore explained by differences in feelings of 
being morally principled and anticipated SE, as opposed to being directly influenced by 
feelings of acceptance or rejection. 
Study 1b Method  
Study 1b explored the relationship between SR and another important basis for SE: academic 
competence, to further explore differences in the bases for SR and SE. The study also aimed 
to replicate the effect of adherence to morals on participants’ anticipated SR and SE using a 
different moral behaviour (cheating as opposed to lying) and a more detailed scenario to 
encourage stronger immersion in the scenario.  
Participants. One-hundred and seventy-nine English-speaking Western university or 
pre-university students5 (all aged over 18) were recruited through Prolific Academic 
(prolificacademic.co.uk) - an international online participant recruitment platform, receiving 
£1.50 each. Students were purposely recruited to facilitate more “real world” responses to the 
academic competence manipulation (see Evans et al., 2015). Thirty students (16.8%) failed 
end of questionnaire scenario comprehension questions or did not engage with the 
questionnaire (see Appendix A for details of exclusion for non-engagement for all studies), 
leaving 148 participants (see Table 1 for sample characteristics and Appendix B for 
additional sample details).  
Materials and procedure. Scenarios were piloted with several university students for 
clarity, credibility and realism and modified accordingly. Participants were asked to imagine 
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they had recently started a new course at university they really wanted to succeed in. 
According to the scenarios (see Appendix A for verbatim), they 1) were confident they would 
do well, and were already achieving high grades or 2) found the course extremely difficult 
and were already struggling to achieve decent grades (high competence (HC) and low 
competence (LC) conditions respectively). Because of unforeseen circumstances, they had to 
leave one of their assignments to the very last minute and a friend from another university 
kindly lends them their essay to give them a bit of a head start. They either 1) decide to 
submit a close copy of their friend’s work (without them knowing), although it goes against 
their principles or 2) decide not to, since it goes against their principles (Low (LM) and high 
adherence to morals (HM) conditions respectively). Following the incident, they do very well 
(or struggle) on remaining assignments and their overall performance was very good (or 
poor) (HC and LC conditions respectively).  
Manipulation checks. Participants indicated (1a) how principled and moral they were 
feeling on a scale from 1 (very immoral) to 10 (very moral) and (1b) how high their moral 
status was on a scale from 1 (very low) to 10 (very high) (rSB=.96). They also indicated (2a) 
how academically competent they were feeling from 1 (very incompetent) to 10 (very 
competent) and (2b) how confident they were in their academic abilities from 1 (not 
confident) to 10 (very confident) (rSB =.97).  
Outcome and baseline measures. These were the same as in Study 1a with similar 
internal reliabilities, except that the baseline state SR measure was the same as the outcome 
measure but with the instruction to respond at that moment (α=.81).  
Comprehension checks. Questions were included to check participants had 
understood and read fully the scenario given its length (see Appendix A).  
Subsidiary measures. The Contingency of Self-Worth virtue subscale (Crocker et al. 
2003) was administered to explore whether the relationship of morally principled behaviour 
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with SR differed according to level of virtue-contingent SE. This was of interest since theory 
on contingencies of self-worth (Crocker et al., 2003) would predict a stronger effect of 
morally principled behaviour on SE for people with higher (versus lower) virtue-contingent 
SE, but morally principled behaviour is theorised to be more defining of SR than SE (fuller 
detail is provided in Appendix C).  
Analytical approach. A 2 X 2 MANOVA was used as in Study 1a since anticipated 
scenario SR and SE were strongly correlated (rho = .79). The correlation was high, still 38 
per cent of the variance in state SR and SE was available to be uniquely explained for each. A 
similarly high correlation was also observed between baseline state performance SE (an 
established facet) and RSE (see Appendix D Table 2a for correlations between all measures). 
Baseline state SR was added as a covariate in MANOVA and experienced SR ANCOVA 
analyses but not baseline state SE because only the first related to the outcome. 
Study 1b: Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses. The conditions did not differ in terms of participants’ 
demographic characteristics, SE or SR (trait or state). There were more white (vs. non-white) 
participants in the HM condition, χ2(1,147)=10.16, p=.001, but ethnicity did not impact any 
of the baseline or outcome variables.  
Manipulation checks. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for manipulation check 
and outcome measures.  
Moral ratings. 2 X 2 ANOVA confirmed that participants felt more morally 
principled in the HM versus LM condition, F(1,144)=275.81, p<.001 (Ƞp2=.66). 
Higher moral ratings were also found in the HC versus LC condition, F(1,144)=16.91, 
p<.001 (Ƞp2= .11). In view of this, results are also presented for the effect of academic 
competence after controlling for moral ratings in anticipated SR and SE ANCOVA analyses. 
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Academic competence ratings. 2 X 2 ANOVA confirmed that participants felt more 
academically competent in the HC versus LC condition, F (1, 144) = 208.80, p < .001 (Ƞp2= 
.59). 
Higher competence ratings were also found in the HM versus LM condition, 
F(1,144)=38.75, p<.001 (Ƞp2= .21). However, a significant adherence to morals x academic 
competence interaction, F(1,144)=16.35, p<.001 (Ƞp2= .10), indicated when followed-up, a 
significant effect of adherence to morals in the HC condition only, p < .001. The effect of 
academic competence was significant in the HM, p < .001, and LM conditions, p < .001.  
Main results. 2 X 2 MANCOVA showed a significant multivariate main effect of 
adherence to morals, F(2,139)=68.60, p<.001; Wilk’s Lamba = .50, Ƞp2=.50 and academic 
competence, F(2,139)=21.56, p<.001; Wilk’s Lamba = .76, Ƞp2=.24, and no interaction. 
Adherence to morals. Univariate tests showed a significant effect of adherence to 
morals on anticipated SR, F(1,140)=129.87, p<.001 (Ƞp2= .48), CI95% = [1.803, 2.560] and 
SE, F(1, 140)= 82.29, p<.001 (Ƞp2=.37), CI95% = [1.642, 2.558], in the expected direction. 
The effect on anticipated SR remained after controlling for anticipated SE, F(1,139)=34.95, 
p<.001 (Ƞp2= .20), CI95% = [.768, 1.539], and also competence ratings, F(1,138)=32.16, 
p<.001 (Ƞp2= .19), CI95% = [.723, 1.498]. Hypothesis 1 that adherence to morals will 
influence self-respect was therefore supported. Moreover, the effect of adherence to morals 
on SE was no longer significant after adjusting for anticipated SR, F (1, 140) = 2.79, p=.097 
(Ƞp2=.02), 95% CI = [-.078, .924], and became even weaker after also adjusting for academic 
competence ratings, F (1, 139) = 1.32, p=.253 (Ƞp2=.01), CI95% = [-.201, .758]. 
A mediation analysis, adjusting for baseline state SR and academic competence 
manipulation supported anticipated SR to mediate the effect of adherence to morals on 
anticipated SE (indirect effect = 1.59, CI95% = 1.15, 2.10 > 0), and hypothesis 2 (see Table 5 
for the regression coefficients).  
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Academic competence. Univariate tests showed a significant effect of academic 
competence on anticipated SE, F(1,140)= 41.46, p<.001 (Ƞp2=.23), CI95% = [1.031, 1.945]. 
Hypothesis 4 that academic competence will influence SE was therefore supported. This 
effect remained after adjusting for moral ratings, F(1,141) = 18.75, p <.001 (Ƞp2=.12), CI95% 
= [.483, 1.294], or anticipated SR, F(1,140) = 14.18, p <.001 (Ƞp2=.09), CI95% = [.361, 
1.160], alongside anticipated SR, F(1, 145) = 91.39, p<.001 (Ƞp2=.40). This pattern of results 
suggests that both SR and academic competence uniquely influence SE. 
A significant effect on anticipated SR was also found, F(1,140)=24.45, 
p<.001(Ƞp2=.15), CI95% = [.567, 1.323], with higher anticipated SR in the HC versus LC 
condition. However, the effect became smaller after controlling for moral ratings, F(1, 140)= 
7.56, p=.007 (Ƞp2=.05), CI95% = [-.391, .620] and disappeared after controlling for anticipated 
SE, F(1, 139)=1.51, p=.221 (Ƞp2=.01), CI95% = [-.132, .564]. The main effect of competence 
was therefore explained by differences in feelings of being morally principled and anticipated 
SE, as opposed to directly influenced by feelings of competence. 
Subsidiary analysis. A test of moderation did not find a differential relationship of 
morally principled behaviour with SR according to virtue-contingent self-esteem levels after 
adjusting for SE, but showed a stronger relationship of morally principled behaviour with SE 
for participants who were higher versus lower on virtue-contingent self-esteem, which was in 
line with past literature. The full results are presented in Appendix C. 
In sum, Studies 1a and 1b provided support for the hypotheses and for SR to be a 
component of SE tied to moral integrity, distinct from IA and academic competence. 
Adherence to morals was found to influence anticipated SR (over and above anticipated SE), 
and anticipated SR mediated the effect of adherence to morals on anticipated SE. In contrast, 
IA and academic competence no longer influenced anticipated SR after controlling for ratings 
of being morally principled and anticipated SE but influenced SE independently of SR. The 
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studies portrayed widely endorsed moral principles, however, there could be variations in 
how people perceive immoral behaviours as going against their principles (Liu & Ditto, 
2012). Study 2 aimed to generalise the findings relating to adherence to morals and academic 
competence by asking participants to respond to personally selected situations they had 
experienced.  
Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to provide additional support for the conclusions of Studies 1a and 1b 
and enhance ecological validity by asking participants to relive situations in their life when 
they had (or had not) compromised on their morals and did particularly well (or badly) 
academically and indicate their SR and SE at that moment in time. The study played an 
important role in informing Study 3 and provided some useful results in relation to academic 
competence specifically (as opposed to broader task-related competence) but presented a 
number of difficulties, and is therefore reported here in less detail (additional details can be 
found in Appendix E).  
Although the study originally planned to use a 2 (adherence to morals: high/low) X 2 
(academic competence: high/low) design, a pilot study to test the task’s feasibility found that 
asking participants to think back to a situation when they had performed particularly well on 
an academic task but had compromised on their morals disrupted the academic competence 
manipulation. As a result, the study tested the influence of adherence to morals and 
competence on SR and SE by comparing the high and low adherence to morals conditions 
when competence was low (HM-LC/LM-LC), and the high and low competence conditions 
when adherence to morals was high (HM-HC/HM-LC). Participants were pseudo-randomly 
allocated to one of these three conditions and the study was analysed in two parts.  
Methods 
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Out of 259 English-speaking Western university students recruited through Prolific 
Academic for £1.50, and through RPS, 178 recalled a relevant situation (69%); 68 (out of 83) 
a HM-LC situation, 52 (out of 105) a LM-LC situation6 and 58 (out of 71) a HM-HC 
situation (see Table 1 for sample characteristics). 
Participants were asked in an online questionnaire to relive a scenario/experience in 
their life in an academic setting (e.g. school, college, university) in which they had (1) 
performed particularly badly on an academic/scholarly task and had compromised on their 
morals (LM-LC), (2) performed particularly badly on an academic/scholarly task and had not 
compromised on their morals (HM-LC), or (3) performed particularly well on an 
academic/scholarly task and had not compromised on their morals (HM-HC) and were 
provided with examples to help them recall a specific experience, such as cheating, being 
unfair, or making false excuses in the LM condition and opposite behaviours in the HM 
condition (see Appendix A). Participants were instructed to take three minutes to relive the 
scenario/experience, including associated emotions, and to describe it. 
Manipulation checks, outcome and baseline measures were identical to those used in 
Study 1b with similar internal reliabilities, except the SE measure included an additional 
item: “I feel good about myself” (see Rubins & Hewstone, 1998) (rated from 1 = not very 
true of me, 7 = very true of me, rSB =.91)
7   and the baseline state SR measure included an 
additional item: I feel I have a high degree of self-respect (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree) with standardised item scores averaged into one index (α=.83). 
Parallel analysis and exploratory factor analysis (EFA) fit indices using Principal Axis 
factoring8 supported the five SR and SE outcome items representing two factors as opposed 
to one (see Table 6); the SR and SE items loaded on their respective factors (loadings 
between .51 and .90), with low factor loadings on the other factor (between .02 and .10), and 
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a factor correlation of .77, indicating that the SR and SE measures represent two related but 
distinct constructs (see Appendix F for full details).  
Results and Discussion 
Although the LC adherence to morals and HM academic competence conditions did 
not differ according to participant demographics, recruitment source, trait or overall state SE, 
LM-LC participants scored significantly lower on baseline performance state SE and trait and 
state SR compared to HM-LC participants, and HM-LC participants scored significantly 
higher on trait SR compared to HM-HC participants. These differences likely reflect 
theoretically consistent self-selection biases whereby high SR individuals who gain a sense of 
worth from being principled are less likely to experience situations in which they 
compromise on their morals and more likely to resist the urge of compromising on their 
morals despite a potential need. Individuals with lower performance SE may feel more of a 
need for moral compromise to not do badly academically and protect their SE.  
As a result, analyses testing the impact of adherence to morals controlled for baseline 
differences in performance SE and state SR9 and analyses testing the impact of academic 
competence controlled for baseline differences in trait SR in M/ANOVA analyses by adding 
these as covariates. MANOVAs were used for main analyses since experienced SR and SE 
were strongly correlated (rho = .72 and rho =.61 respectively). Baseline overall state SE was 
also added as a covariate in the MANOVA and experienced SE ANCOVA analyses testing 
the impact of academic competence10 but was too strongly related to performance state SE 
(rho =.80) to be added as a covariate in analyses testing the impact of adherence to morals. 
Tables 7 and 9 present descriptive statistics for manipulation check and outcome 
measures. The manipulations were effective. Participants rated themselves significantly more 
morally principled in the HM-LC versus LM-LC condition, F(1,108)=31.38, p<.001 
(Ƞp2=.23), with no effect on academic competence ratings. Participants also rated themselves 
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significantly more competent in the HM-HC versus HM-LC condition, F(1,122)=22.03, 
p<.001 (Ƞp2=.15), with no effect on moral ratings.  
Using real situations, Study 2 was able to replicate the main findings of Studies 1a 
and 1b. Following significant multivariate MANOVA effects (see Appendix E), the study 
showed a main effect of adherence to morals on SR (when academic competence was held 
constant and low), F(1,108)=22.76, p<.001 (Ƞp2= .17), CI95% = [.600, 1.453], which remained 
significant after adjusting for experienced SE, F(1,107)=12.15, p=.001 (Ƞp2= .10), CI95% 
=[.273, .995]. This effect mediated the effect of adherence to morals on SE, F(1,108)= 9.53, 
p=.001 (Ƞp2=.08), CI95% =[.304, 1.393] (indirect effect = .77, CI95% = .47, 1.14) (see Figure 1 
for a schematic representation and Table 8 for all regression coefficients).  
Academic competence did not influence SR (when adherence to morals was held 
constant and high), F(1,120)= 2.13, p=.148 (Ƞp2= .02), CI95% = [-.103, .678], with the effect 
close to zero after controlling for experienced SE, F(1,121)=.06, p=.803 (Ƞp2= .001), 95% CI 
= [-.397, 308], but influenced SE, F(1,120)= 11.73, p=.001 (Ƞp2=.09), CI95% = [.346, 1.295], 
independently of SR, F(1,115)= 9.40, p=.003, (Ƞp2=.08), CI95% = [.230, 1.07]. Participants 
often drawing on experiences of cheating to describe moral compromise in an academic 
setting made it difficult to study the impact of competence in the low morals condition, and 
baseline differences in SR and performance SE emerged. Study 3 was carried out to address 
these limitations.  
Study 3 
Study 3 aimed to replicate Study 2 using real situations but focusing on more broadly 
defined task-related competence in order to test the full 2 (adherence to morals: high 
(HM)/low(LM)) X 2 (competence: high(HC)/low(LC)) design. Additional measures were 
also put in place to reduce selection biases leading to differences in baseline SR and 
performance SE between conditions.  
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Methods 
Participants, materials and procedure. Participants were asked in an online 
questionnaire to recall and relive a scenario/experience in their life in which (1) they had 
performed particularly badly (e.g. at work, school or other activity) despite trying their best 
and (1a) had compromised on their morals (LM-LC condition) or (1b) had not compromised 
on their morals (HM-LC condition), or (2) they had performed particularly well and (2a) had 
compromised on their morals but still felt competent (LM-HC condition), or (2b) had not 
compromised on their morals (HM-HC). Out of 241 English-speaking Western adults 
recruited through Prolific Academic for £1.65, 204 recalled a relevant situation (85%); 51 
(out of 62) a HM-LC, 51 (out of 59) a LM-LC, 51 (out of 57) a HM-HC, 51 (out of 63) a 
LM-HC situation. An older non-student sample was recruited to ensure participants had a 
wider range of experiences to draw from (see Table 1 for sample characteristics, Appendix B 
for additional details).  
Participants were provided with a broad range of examples of situations to facilitate 
retrieval of a relevant experience and reduce selection biases, such as lying or concealing 
information, behaving unfairly or being selfish, adopting unethical organisational practices in 
the LM conditions (see Appendix A). Participants were also told most people had 
experienced at least one such situation in their lives and to think back to different periods in 
their life when this may have happened to encourage deeper self-reflection, and in the LM 
conditions, that this may not be indicative of the kind of person they are in general to reduce 
defensive reactions, particularly from high SR individuals who do not view themselves as 
immoral. Participants were instructed to take three minutes to think of and relive the 
scenario/experience, including associated emotions, and to describe it. 
Manipulation checks. The adherence to morals manipulation check was the same as 
in Study 2 (with the addition of “at that time” at the end of the statement) (rSB =.94). For the 
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competence manipulation check, participants indicated how high they felt their performance 
was at the time from 1 (very low) to 10 (very high) and how competent they felt at the time 
from 1 (very incompetent) to 10 (very competent) (rSB =.90).  
Outcome measures. The measures were the same as in Study 2, except the SR 
measure included an additional item: “I have little respect for myself”, and the SE measure 
included an additional three items adapted from the general self-concept subscale of the Self 
Description Questionnaire III (Marsh, 1984): “I have pretty positive feelings about myself”, 
“I have pretty negative feelings about myself” and “I view myself positively”, rated on the 
same 7-pt Likert scale as the other items. 
Parallel analysis and EFA fit indices supported the nine items representing two factors 
as opposed to one; the SR and SE items loaded well on their respective factors (loadings of 
.50 to .97) with a factor correlation of .79, indicating that the SR and SE measures represent 
two related but distinct constructs (see Table 6 and Appendix F for full details). Moreover, an 
EFA within a CFA framework (E/CFA)11, which permits to statistically compare model fit, 
using Maximum Likelihood Robust (MLM) estimator, showed an acceptable to good fit for 
the two-factor model distinguishing between SR and SE items (see Appendix F for the factor 
loadings), which was significantly better than the one-factor model, χ2 difference = 82.21, p 
<.001. These findings support the SR and SE items used in Studies 1a-b and 2 tapping two 
distinct constructs. 
Nevertheless, an even better fit for a three-factor model suggested the measures could 
be improved further, by removing the SR item “I wish I could have more respect for myself” 
and the SE item “I feel good about myself”, which appeared to be less consistent or pure 
markers12. The first item loaded most strongly on a third factor and the second item cross-
loaded on the SR factor (factor loading of .69 on the SE factor and .43 on the SR factor) (see 
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Table 2 in Appendix F). The three-item SR factor (α=.90) correlated at .78 with the four-item 
SE factor (α=.95).  
Baseline measures. The same measures were used as in Study 1b with similar internal 
reliabilities, except state SR was measured with the same three items used for the revised SR 
outcome measure (α=.92) (data was also collected for the item “I wish I could have more 
respect for myself” at baseline).  
Analytical approach. A 2 X 2 MANOVA was used since experienced SR and SE 
outcome measures were strongly correlated (rho = .77). Despite the high correlation, 41 per 
cent (1 - .772) of the variance in state SR and SE remains available to be uniquely explained 
for each. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses. The conditions did not differ in terms of background or 
baseline characteristics. Baseline state SR and SE were added as covariates in MANOVA and 
experienced SR and SE ANCOVA analyses respectively because they were significantly 
correlated with these outcomes (see Appendix D Table 4a). 
Manipulation checks. Table 10 presents descriptive statistics for manipulation 
checks and outcome measures. 
Moral ratings. 2 X 2 ANOVA confirmed participants rated themselves more morally 
principled in the HM versus LM condition, F(1,199)=188.71, p<.001 (Ƞp2=.49).  
Higher moral ratings were also found in the HC versus LC condition, F(1,199)=43.82, 
p<.001 (Ƞp2=.18), as in Study 1b, with no significant interaction. We therefore also present 
results for the effect of competence after controlling for moral ratings in anticipated SR and 
SE ANCOVA analyses. 
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Competence ratings. 2 X 2 ANCOVA confirmed participants rated themselves 
significantly more competent in the HC versus LC condition, F(1,198)=193.44, p<.001 
(Ƞp2=.49).  
Higher competence ratings were also found in the HM versus LM condition, 
F(1,195)=13.18, p<.001 (Ƞp2=.06). Results are therefore also presented for the effect of 
adherence to morals after controlling for competence ratings in anticipated SR and SE 
ANCOVA analyses. 
Main results. 2 X 2 MANCOVA showed a significant multivariate main effect of 
adherence to morals, F(1,187)= 26.34, p<.001; Wilk’s Lamba = .78, Ƞp2=.22 and 
competence, F(1,187)= 24.94, p<.001; Wilk’s Lamba = .79, Ƞp2=.21, and no interaction.  
Adherence to morals. Univariate tests showed a significant effect of adherence to 
morals on experienced SR, F(1,188)=51.45, p<.001 (Ƞp2= .22), 95% CI =[.963, 1.693], and 
SE, F(1,188)= 33.74, p<.001 (Ƞp2=.15), 95% CI =[.725, 1.472], in the expected direction. The 
effect on SR remained after adjusting for experienced SE, F(1,194)=16.39, p<.001 (Ƞp2= .08), 
CI95% = [.302, .877], and competence ratings also, F(1,191)=16.29, p<.001 (Ƞp2= .08), CI95% 
= [.304, .886]. Hypothesis 1 that adherence to moral principles will influence SR was 
therefore supported. In contrast, the effect on SE was no longer significant after adjusting for 
experienced SR, F(1,189)= 3.72, p=.055 (Ƞp2=.02), CI95% = [-.007, .598], and became even 
weaker after also adjusting for competence ratings, F(1,186)= 2.24, p=.136 (Ƞp2=.01), CI95% 
= [-.07, .508]. 
A mediation analysis, adjusting for baseline state SR and SE and the competence 
manipulation supported experienced SR mediating the effect of adherence to morals on 
experienced SE (indirect effect = .93, CI95% = .66, 1.24 > 0), and hypothesis 2 (see Figure 2 
for a schematic representation and Table 11 for all regression coefficients).  
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Competence. Univariate tests showed a significant effect of competence on 
experienced SE, F(1,188)= 48.29, p<.001 (Ƞp2=.20), CI95% = [.933, 1.673], in the expected 
direction, supporting Hypothesis 4 that competence will influence self-esteem. This effect 
remained after adjusting for moral ratings, F(1,189) = 19.27, p <.001 (Ƞp2=.09), CI95% = 
[.485, 1.275], or experienced SR, F(1,189) = 36.42, p <.001 (Ƞp2=.16), CI95% = [.582, 1.147], 
alongside experienced SR, F(1, 186) = 150.42, p<.001 (Ƞp2=.44). This pattern of results 
indicates that both SR and competence uniquely influence SE.  
A significant effect on experienced SR was also found, F(1,188)=14.18, 
p<.001(Ƞp2=.07), CI95% = [.329, 1.053], with higher SR in the HC versus LC condition. 
However, the effect was no longer significant after controlling for moral ratings, F(1, 194)= 
2.27, p=.134 (Ƞp2=.01), CI95% = [-.09, .648] or experienced SE, F(1, 194)=1.15, p=.286 
(Ƞp2=.01), CI95% = [-.133, .450].  
In sum, Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 using the full 2X2 design and in the 
absence of baseline differences between conditions. 
Post-hoc analyses: Further exploring the relationship between self-respect and 
self-esteem through factor analysis. Consistent with the main study results, factor analyses 
of baseline state and trait SR and SE data supported SR to be distinct from global SE and 
other specific self-evaluations or facets. 
EFA of SSES and state SR items supported a five-factor solution, which showed SR 
to be a separate factor from social approval, appearance and performance SE and a fifth 
factor corresponding to self-deprecation. Correlations were .35, .39, .59 and .50 between SR 
and each factor respectively, showing SR to be related to, yet distinct from, the other SE 
facets investigated. After adding four baseline state global SE items to the EFA (the same as 
those making up the outcome measure that were also taken at baseline), an additional positive 
global SE factor emerged on which the global SE items loaded, the SR factor became more 
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clearly defined, and the SR-performance SE correlation decreased to .54, with the correlation 
with global SE being .54 (see Table 6 for EFA fit indices and Appendix F for fuller details 
and results of all analyses in this section).  
In contrast, an EFA of the 10 RSE items, the seven descriptive trait SRS items 
relating to being moral, principled and honourable and two global appraisal trait SR items (I 
have a lot of respect for myself” and “I feel I have a high degree of self-respect”) in 
combined samples from Studies 2 and 3 (N=518), supported a four-factor solution that 
showed the descriptive SRS and global appraisal SR items to load on the same factor, which 
was distinct from global SE, itself divided into overall self-satisfaction and two other factors 
interpreted by Tafarodi and Swann (1995) as reflecting the “self-competence” (i.e. feeling 
confident, capable and effective) and “self-liking” (i.e. social value ascribed) dimensions of 
global SE. The SR factor correlated at .67, .55 and .55 with each SE factor respectively. This 
analysis further supports SR’s close link to attributes of being moral and principled.  
An exploratory bifactor analysis, followed by a confirmatory bifactor analysis (see 
Reise, 2012) also supported SR being a subdomain of global SE distinct from other facets. In 
line with past research showing a bifactor model to provide the best factor representation for 
the SSES (see McCain, Jonason, Foster, & Campbell, 2015), an exploratory bifactor model 
showed the state SR items to behave as a fourth grouping factor, alongside social approval, 
appearance SE and performance SE grouping factors, that explained additional common 
variance to that explained by the general (g) factor (here global SE or evaluation towards the 
self, underpinning all items) like the other three SE facets. A reduced bifactor CFA model13 
presented an acceptable fit, with all SR items loading significantly on the SR grouping factor, 
suggesting notable amounts of unique variance for the SR items (Gomez et al., 2015), and 
was a significantly better fit than a bifactor model where the SR items loaded on the general 
factor only, χ2 difference = 69.87, p <.001, or bifactor models in which the SR items were 
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specified to load on the general and performance SE, appearance SE or social approval 
grouping factors instead. SR thus shares communalities with the general factor global SE 
whilst also exhibiting specific elements that are separate and unique from it. This evidence, 
combined with studies 1-3 showing SR to have distinctive association patterns from SE, 
further supports SR as a distinct construct in its own right (Gomez et al., 2015).  
General discussion 
While the term “self-respect” is commonly used in everyday language, the concept 
has been the object of very little psychological research. Yet, it is recognised to be an 
important aspect of self-esteem (e.g. Kernis, 2003; Rosenberg, 1965) and believed to be 
critical to living a satisfying and flourishing life (Dillon, 2010). This research sought to 
provide an empirically supported understanding of the bases of self-respect, and how it 
differs from self-esteem, to develop our understanding of this important concept. Findings 
support the conceptualisation of self-respect as a component of self-esteem linked to morally 
principled conduct (Kumashiro et al., 2002; Kristjansson, 2007), rather than a feature of 
global self-esteem influenced by a range of diverse self-domains (Kernis, 2003).  
Four experimental studies provide evidence that adherence to morals is a key feature 
of self-respect, with a significant effect of the adherence to morals manipulation on 
participants’ anticipated state self-respect when imagining themselves in scenarios and felt 
state self-respect in a past situation they relived. This is the first set of studies to provide 
direct evidence for the conceptualisation of self-respect as linked to morally principled 
conduct, as put forth by philosophers and other authors (e.g. Kumashiro et al., 2002; 
Kristjansson, 2007; Roland & Foxx, 2003), thus establishing self-respect as likely to play an 
important role in the understanding of moral behaviour. Study 3 unexpectedly provided 
additional support for this argument by showing that participants who recalled a situation in 
which they compromised on their morals had lower baseline self-respect than those who 
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recalled a situation in which they did not, when performing badly academically. Future 
research should test this hypothesis more formally in view of research demonstrating the 
predictive value of trait self-esteem when domain-specific self-esteem relevant to the 
outcome is assessed (Baumeister et al., 2003) and showing momentary feelings of moral self-
worth to influence engagement in moral behaviours (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). It 
should be noted that self-respect is conceptualised as involving a subjective judgment of 
honourable and moral character and behaviour such that it may relate to generally agreed 
notions of moral behaviour only when individuals embrace such notions.  
An important finding in all studies was that self-respect mediated the effect of 
adherence to morals on self-esteem, furthering our understanding of the relationship between 
morally principled conduct and self-esteem, which has not benefitted from much research 
(Jennings, Mitchell, & Hannah, 2015). Subsidiary analyses in Study 1b and post-hoc analyses 
in Study 3 further supported moral integrity as being more defining of self-respect than self-
esteem. In addition to moral behaviour being associated with self-esteem because it allows 
individuals who value being moral to meet their “ought” or “ideal” selves (Jennings et al., 
2015), the subsidiary analysis in Study 1b indicated self-evaluation as worthy of respect can 
also explain the link between moral behaviour and self-esteem, even when one is not strongly 
invested in being moral per se. Self-respect involves an appraisal of oneself as worthy of high 
regard connected to feelings of dignity, honour and being principled  and is linked to, yet 
broader than moral self-approval (see Kumashiro et al., 2002; Luchies et al., 2010). For 
instance, Luchies et al. (2010) showed that self-respect diminished when forgiving a 
transgressor who had not made amends. Future research should investigate further the 
relationship between the moral self and self-respect, including factors facilitating an attitude 
of respect for oneself when engaging in morally principled behaviour.  
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The influence of competence and interpersonal appraisals (IA) on self-respect and 
self-esteem was also investigated. Studies 1b and 3 found academic or broader task-related 
competence to influence self-respect, however only indirectly through feelings of being 
morally principled or anticipated/felt self-esteem. Study 2 showed no effect of academic 
performance per se on self-respect when adherence to morals was held constant. These 
findings suggest that self-respect, does not appear to be based on intellectual qualities and 
talents/skills, such that its basis is narrower than that for interpersonal respect (Frei & Shaver, 
2002; Hamilton & Fallot, 1974; Prestwich, & Lalljee, 2009). Despite this, the findings 
suggest that the relationship between competence, self-respect and self-esteem is complicated 
since competence could possibly modify perceptions of moral integrity, and vice-versa.  
Study 1 found a main effect of IA on self-respect, but the effect became small after 
adjusting for feelings of being morally principled and was no longer significant after 
adjusting for global self-esteem, whilst the effect of IA on self-esteem remained significant 
after adjusting for self-respect (as was the case for competence). Therefore self-respect does 
not appear to be directly influenced by feelings of acceptance or rejection, although social 
(dis)approval by peers might function as a looking glass self (Cooley, 1902), intensifying 
self-perceptions of being (im)moral and (un)principled, and indirectly influencing self-
respect. The closer influence of IA on self-esteem than self-respect is consistent with social 
popularity being more strongly linked to liking than respect (Hamilton & Fallot, 1974).  
Moreover, the studies indicated that self-respect influenced self-esteem independently 
of IA (Study 1a) or competence (Studies 1b, 2 and 3). Baseline post-hoc analyses in Study 3 
also demonstrated state self-respect to be a factor sufficiently distinct from performance, 
social and appearance self-esteem as well as global self-esteem, suggesting that self-respect 
should be measured alongside these self-esteem domains to improve the prediction of self-
esteem. The high bivariate correlations between state self-respect and global self-esteem may 
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be related to principled behaviour’s link to competence, enhanced self-efficacy and greater 
confidence in being accepted by others associated with high self-respect. Also, the global 
appraisal nature of the self-respect items make them liable to be strongly influenced by 
positive affectivity linked to self-esteem in the same manner as performance self-esteem also 
correlates highly with trait self-esteem as it contains global evaluative items such as “I feel 
like I’m not doing well”. On the whole, the findings support self-respect as a sense of worth 
derived from being morally principled, as opposed to competent or popular. This suggests 
that self-respect may be a more internal and controllable source of self-esteem and therefore 
more amenable to intervention as a trait (Crocker et al., 2003).  
The research suffered from some limitations. The study used a single item to measure 
anticipated self-esteem in Studies 1a and 1b, yet, it has been well validated, performing 
similarly to the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Robins et al., 2001). Moreover, single items 
have been shown to demonstrate reasonable levels of reliability and validity when not 
ambiguous and assessing reasonably homogeneous unidimensional constructs as was the case 
here since perceptions of global self-esteem and self-respect were assessed (Postmes, 
Haslam, & Jans, 2013; Robins et al., 2001). Due to the lack of prior studies on which to base 
sample size power calculations, studies planned to recruit a minimum of 128 participants to 
detect a medium effect size (Cohen, 1992), but Study 2 fell a little short. However, power did 
not appear to be an issue since effect sizes were medium to large and detected, or were very 
small, indicating no or little meaningful effect to be detected.  
An experimental design with set vignettes in Studies 1a and 1b afforded more control 
over the factors of interest, strengthening causal conclusions regarding their impact on self-
respect and self-esteem, and was needed to separate the influence of interrelated sources of 
self-esteem. Moreover, it permitted investigation of immediate responses to undesirable 
behaviour, in a potentially less threatening way given the role play involved, possibly 
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facilitating their disclosure. However, responses in vignettes may differ to those in real life, 
although similarities have been found between hypothetical vignette and actual behaviour 
(Evans et al., 2015), and some may believe that the ends justify immoral behaviour. 
Therefore studies 2 and 3 were carried out to increase ecological validity by asking 
participants to select personally relevant situations they had experienced. This introduced 
some unpredicted but theoretically consistent differences between conditions in Study 2, 
notably in baseline self-respect, likely due to high self-respect individuals being better at 
resisting moral compromise when the need arises, such as when doing badly academically. 
Nonetheless, the main findings relating to adherence to morals and competence held after 
adjusting for these baseline differences in Study 2 and were replicated in Study 3 which was 
not subject to this potential bias, strengthening the conclusions.  
Conclusions 
The studies have helped advance our understanding of self-respect, a concept that has 
been neglected in the psychological literature and often used interchangeably with self-
esteem. Consistent with theories that self-respect is an attitude of respect for oneself based on 
principled and honourable behaviour, the experimental studies provided direct evidence for 
self-respect being influenced by moral integrity, and showed self-respect to mediate the effect 
of morally principled behaviour on self-esteem. On the other hand, they did not support self-
respect to be directly based on competence or social popularity. This work strengthens the 
view that self-respect is a specific self-evaluation that is more internal and as a trait likely to 
be more amenable to intervention, and highlights its potentially important implications for the 
study of moral behaviour. This work also suggests self-respect should be measured alongside 
other well-established self-esteem components to enhance prediction of self-esteem, although 
future research is needed to study the relationship between self-respect and other self-esteem 
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domains not investigated here. Strengthening self-respect has the potential to enhance 
individual well-being whilst benefitting society at large. 
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Footnotes 
1In all parallel analyses and EFAs (unless indicated otherwise), the Minres factoring 
method was used because it provides results similar to Maximum Likelihood (a more 
powerful estimator) without requiring multivariate normal distribution (Harman & Jones, 
1966). All factor analyses were done in R 3.5.1; see appendices for packages used. 
2In all studies, findings were similar when the full measure (α > .89) or a reduced 
measure without the self-respect item was used (α > .88). 
3The Spearman-Brown coefficient has been shown to be a better measure of reliability 
for two-item measures (Eisinga, Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2012). 
4There were violations of the homogeneity of variance assumption in Studies 1a and 3 
and of the normality assumption in all studies but these were only modest and unlikely to be 
problematic, especially since the groups were very similar in size (see Glass, Peckham, & 
Sanders, 1972). Analysis of single Likert scale items using the F-test has also been shown to 
be robust when testing is on an a priori basis, items have at least 5 scale points and the 
underlying concept can be considered continuous (Glass et al., 1972). 
5The majority were university students with only 12 pre-university students; these were 
similarly represented in the different conditions with no difference in baseline or outcome 
scores.  
6More participants were recruited in this condition due to a lower likelihood of having 
had such an experience to make the groups more similar in size.  
7Findings were similar when the single self-esteem item (Robins et al., 2001) was used 
on its own.  
8PA was used in this analysis because other factoring methods presented identification 
problems.  
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9State SR was more strongly related to the outcome but findings were similar after 
adjusting for trait SR.  
10Baseline state SR was not added as a covariate because trait and state SR were highly 
correlated (r = .77) but findings were similar after adjusting for state instead of trait SR. None 
of the analyses suffered from multicollinearity.  
11E/CFA provides the benefits of CFA estimation (e.g. more extensive fit information 
than EFA, use of Maximum Likelihood Robust estimation) without the restriction of fixing 
all cross-loadings to 0, which can result in less accurate parameters when cross-loadings are 
present (see Asparouhov, Muthén, & Morin, 2015; Brown, 2014). 
12The revised three-item SR measure was strongly correlated with the full four-item SR 
measure (r=.97) and Studies 1a-b and 2 three-item SR measure (r=.97). The revised four-item 
SE measure was also strongly correlated with the five-item SE measure (r=.99) and Study 2 
two-item SE measure (r=.94). Findings were also similar in Studies 1a-b and 2 when the item 
“I wish I had more respect for myself” was removed from the SR measure.  
13Three items were removed because of problematic cross-loadings on grouping factors 
and another three (non-SR items) for higher loadings on non-intended than intended factors 
(one non-SR item was also specified to load on the general factor only because of weak 
loadings on all grouping factors). Little scale content was likely to have been lost since 
correlations between the original and reduced total and subscale SSES scores remained high 
(all ˃.92). The MLM estimator was used.
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Table 1: Sample characteristics  
 Study 1a Study 1b Study 2 Study 3 
N 159 148 178 204 
M age (SD)  22.03 (7.09) 24.67 (8.64) 23.20 (6.18) 35.41 (10.88) 
Gender (%)     
Male 18 64 66 74 
Female  140 83 107 128 
Unreported 1 1 3 2 
Ethnicity     
White  103 149 175 
White-British 146    
White-other 2    
Asian 3 18 17 15 
Black 3 14 2 6 
Other 4 11 9 6 
Unreported 1 2 1 2 
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Table 2 
Effects of Adherence to Morals and Interpersonal Appraisal (IA) on Self-Respect and Self-Esteem Ratings (and Moral and IA Ratings) 
  Moral ratings IA ratings Self-Respect Self-Esteem 
Morals Interpersonal 
Appraisal 
M
  
SD N M
  
SD N M
  
SD N M SD N 
High Positive 8.20 1.86 41 8.50 2.28 42 5.63 1.15 41 5.02 1.60 42 
 Negative 5.38 2.27 37 2.69 2.38 36 4.37 1.27 36 3.33 1.59 36 
 Total 6.86 2.49 78 5.82 3.72 78 5.04 1.36 77 4.24 1.80 78 
Low Positive 4.43 2.32 37 8.70 1.65 37 3.66 1.36 36 4.03 1.61 37 
 Negative 2.66 2.11 38 2.58 2.10 38 2.77 1.69 38 2.82 1.71 38 
 Total 3.53 2.37 75 5.60 3.61 75 3.20 1.59 74 3.41 1.76 75 
Total Positive 6.41 2.81 78 8.59 2.00 79 4.71 1.59 77 4.56 1.67 79 
 Negative 4.00 2.57 75 2.64 2.22 74 3.55 1.69 74 3.07 1.66 74 
 Total 5.23 2.94 153 5.71 3.65 153 4.14 1.74 151 3.84 1.82 153 
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Table 3 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis: test of mediation  
  Anticipated Self-Respect Anticipated Self-Esteem 
    Step 1  Step 2  
  B t B t B t 
Adherence to morals 1.67 7.29*** .76 3.05** -.36 -1.53 
Anticipated self-respect 
Interpersonal Appraisals 
Baseline state self-esteem 
Baseline state self-respect  
 
1.15 
.02 
.30 
 
4.93*** 
1.91 
1.73 
 
1.52 
.04 
.27 
 
6.05*** 
3.80*** 
1.45 
.66 
.76 
.03 
.07 
8.84*** 
3.50*** 
3.27** 
.48 
Notes. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Adding anticipated self-respect increased the amount of 
variance explained for self-esteem from R2 = .45 to R2 =.64. 
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Table 4 
Effects of Adherence to Morals and Academic Competence on Self-Respect and Self-Esteem Ratings (and Moral and Competence Ratings) 
  Moral ratings Comp ratings Self-Respect Self-Esteem 
Morals Competence M
  
SD N M
  
SD N M
  
SD N M SD N 
High High 8.76 1.31 37 8.22 1.59 37 5.46 1.00 36 5.69 1.41 36 
 Low 6.99 2.14 37 2.71 1.64 37 4.24 1.44 37 3.75 1.59 36 
 Total 7.87 1.97 74 5.46 3.20 74 4.85 1.38 73 4.72 1.79 72 
Low High 3.27 2.10 37 5.18 2.35 37 3.00 1.16 36 3.19 1.47 37 
 Low 2.59 1.55 37 2.08 1.25 37 2.41 1.16 37 2.19 1.31 37 
 Total 2.93 1.86 74 3.63 2.44 74 2.70 1.19 73 2.69 1.47 74 
Total High 6.01 3.26 74 6.70 2.51 74 4.23 1.64 72 4.42 1.91 73 
 Low 4.79 2.88 74 2.40 1.48 74 3.32 1.59 74 2.96 1.65 73 
 Total 5.40 3.13 148 4.55 2.98 148 3.77 1.67 146 3.69 1.92 146 
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Table 5 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis: test of mediation  
  Anticipated Self-Respect Anticipated Self-Esteem 
    Step 1  Step 2  
  B t B t B t 
Adherence to morals 2.18 11.33*** 2.10 8.97*** .51 1.95 
Anticipated self-respect     .73 8.90*** 
Academic competence .94 4.91*** 1.49 6.36*** .80 3.93*** 
Baseline state self-respect .26 3.74*** .31 3.70*** .12 1.73 
Notes. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Adding anticipated self-respect increased the amount of 
variance explained for self-esteem from R2 = .48 to R2 =.67. The pattern of results was similar 
after controlling for competence ratings with an indirect effect of 1.00 (.61, 1.42). 
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Table 6:  
Fit indices for factor analysis models  
Model χ2 (df), p* CFI TLI RMSEA (90% 
CI) 
SRMR  BIC 
Study 2: outcome state measures 
2-factor EFA χ2 (1)=4.99, .026 NA .95 NA NA -0.38 
1-factor EFA χ2 (5)=116.69 NA .72 NA NA 89.86 
Study 3: outcome state measures 
2-factor EFA χ2 (19)=54.18 NA .97 .089 (.061, .116) NA -50.03 
1-factor EFA χ2 (27)=234.32 NA .88 .181 (.158, .2) NA 86.23 
2-factor E/CFA χ2 (19)=39.29, .004 .99 .98 .071 (.039, .102) .02 3950.33 
1-factor E/CFA χ2 (27)=146.31 .93 .91 .157 (.133, .183) .05 4056.42 
Study 3: baseline state  measures 
5-factor EFA χ2 (166)=322.75 NA .93 .066 (.052, .073) NA -587.73 
6-factor EFA with 
global SE items 
χ2 (225)=371.55 NA .95 .057 (.043, .061) NA -862.53 
Exploratory 
bifactor 
χ2 (166)=322.75 NA .93 .066 (.052, .073) NA -587.73 
Bifactor CFA χ2 (118)=248.13 .93 .91 .078 (.065, .092) .06 9753.03 
Bifactor CFA (SR 
items on g factor 
only) 
χ2 (121)=340.62 .89 .86 .101 (.088, .114) .07 9860.30 
Studies 2 and 3: baseline trait measures 
4-factor EFA χ2 (87)=352.82 NA .91 .078 (.069, .085) NA -190.93 
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Notes. TLI and CFI values ≥ .90 and RMSEA values < .08 indicate acceptable model fit 
whilst TLI and CFI values  ≥ .95 and RMSEA values ≤ .06 indicate good model fit; SRMR 
values close to 0 indicate perfect fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Browne & Cudeck, 1992). A lower 
BIC and χ2/df ratio indicate better model fit. *p is <.001 unless indicated otherwise. NA = 
Non-applicable because not provided by the EFA or not considered robust because of the 
very low degrees of freedom (see Kenny et al., 2015). 
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Table 7 
Effects of Adherence to Morals on Self-Respect and Self-Esteem Ratings (and Moral and 
Competence Ratings) 
 Moral ratings Comp ratings Self-Respect Self-Esteem 
Morals M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
High 7.46 1.68 67 5.47 2.58 68 4.77 1.36 68 4.29 1.59 68 
Low 5.08 2.13 51 4.68 2.29 51 3.51 1.30 51 3.10 1.57 50 
Total 6.43 2.22 118 5.13 2.48 119 4.23 1.47 119 3.79 1.68 118 
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Table 8 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis: test of mediation  
  Experienced self-Respect Experienced self-Esteem 
    Step 1  Step 2  
  B t B t B t 
Adherence to morals 1.03 4.77*** .85 3.09** .07 .30 
Experienced self-respect 
Baseline state self-respect 
Performance self-esteem 
 
1.04 
-.02 
 
7.12*** 
-.77 
 
.91 
.02 
 
4.89*** 
.70 
.75 
.13 
.03 
7.58*** 
.70 
1.42 
Notes. *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p <.001. Adding self-respect increased the amount of variance 
explained for self-esteem from R2 = .35 to R2 =.58. 
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Table 9 
Effects of Academic Competence on Self-Respect and Self-Esteem Ratings (and Moral and 
Competence Ratings) 
 Moral ratings Comp ratings Self-Respect Self-Esteem 
Comp M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
High 7.53 1.64 57 7.06 2.10 58 4.78 1.30 58 4.76 1.53 58 
Low 7.46 1.68 67 5.47 2.58 68 4.77 1.36 68 4.29 1.59 68 
Total 7.49 1.66 124 6.20 2.49 126 4.78 1.33 126 4.51 1.57 126 
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Table 10 
Effects of Adherence to Morals and Academic Competence on Self-Respect and Self-Esteem Ratings (and Moral and Competence Ratings) 
  Moral ratings Comp ratings Self-Respect Self-Esteem 
Morals Competence M
  
SD N M
  
SD N M
  
SD N M SD N 
High High 8.57 1.21 50 7.78 1.33 51 5.39 1.22 51 5.35 1.20 51 
 Low 7.03 2.09 51 4.28 2.21 50 4.75 1.51 51 3.82 1.60 50 
 Total 7.79 1.87 101 6.05 2.53 101 5.07 1.40 102 4.59 1.60 101 
Low High 5.15 2.08 51 6.94 1.62 50 4.19 1.43 50 3.94 1.26 51 
 Low 3.18 1.99 51 3.25 2.06 51 3.36 1.57 51 2.80 1.49 51 
 Total 4.17 2.26 102 5.07 2.62 101 3.77 1.55 101 3.37 1.49 102 
Total High 6.84 2.42 101 7.37 1.53 101 4.79 1.45 101 4.65 1.42 102 
 Low 5.11 2.80 102 3.76 2.19 101 4.06 1.69 102 3.30 1.62 101 
 Total 5.97 2.75 203 5.56 2.61 202 4.42 1.61 203 3.98 1.66 203 
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Table 11 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis: test of mediation  
  Experienced Self-Respect Experienced Self-Esteem 
    Step 1  Step 2  
  B t B t B t 
Adherence to morals 1.33 7.20*** 1.09 5.80*** .17 1.06 
Anticipated self-respect 
Competence 
Baseline state self-esteem 
Baseline state self-respect  
 
.69 
.01 
.11 
 
3.78*** 
1.45 
3.86*** 
 
1.30 
.04 
.01 
 
6.95*** 
3.64*** 
.46 
.70 
.82 
.03 
-.07 
12.81*** 
5.76*** 
3.60*** 
-2.86** 
Notes. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Adding anticipated self-respect increased the amount of 
variance explained for self-esteem from R2 = .40 to R2 =.68. The pattern of results was similar 
after controlling for competence ratings with an indirect effect of .69 (.45, .98). Social 
approval ratings had little effect on the pattern of results (see Appendix A). 
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Figure 1 
Mediation model for Study 2  
 
Note. c = total effect, c’ = direct effect   
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Figure 2 
Mediation model for Study 3 
 
Note. c = total effect, c’ = direct effect 
